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ANALYTIC REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT 
MECHANIZATION AND FLIGHT DATA ANALYSIS 
FOR THE F-8 DIGITAL FLY-BY-WIRE AIRCRAFT 
FLIGHT CONTROL SENSORS 
James C. Deckert 
SUMMARY 
The details are presented of an onboard digital computer algo-
rithm designed to reliably detect and isolate the first failure in a 
duplex set of flight control sensors aboard the NASA F-8 Digital 
Fly-by-Wire aircraft. The algorithm's successful flight test program 
is summarized, and specific examples are presented of algorithm behav-
ior in response to software-induced signal faults, both with and 
without aircraft parameter modeling errors. 
This Page Intentionally Left Blank 
SECTION 1 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years the desire to improve aircraft performance and 
to employ advanced aerodynamic designs has moved operational aircraft 
control technology into the realm of active control systems. These 
systems not only reduce pilot workload but, in many cases, are essen-
tial for the flight control of the aircraft. Likewise, the evolution 
of the control-configured vehicle, an aircraft whose aerodynamic 
design alone is unable to provide satisfactory handling qualities, re-
quires a control system that is automatic and highly reliable. How-
ever, individual controller components do not have the reliability, of 
the order of that of the airframe itself, required for such flight-
critical applications. This dictates that a fault-tolerant control 
system be implemented, utilizing component replication and incorporat-
ing some technique for redundancy management. 
Although control sensor redunda~cy management is relatively 
simple for triplex and higher instrument redundancy, other considera-
tions such as weight, volume, power, and life-cycle costs suggest that 
the required level of sensor redundancy should be supplied by keeping 
direct redundancy, i.e., sensor replication, to a minimum and utiliz-
ing in its place the analytic redundancy inherent in the various 
physical relationships among the variables measured by unlike sen-
sors. In June 1975 the Charles Stark Draper Laboratory (CSDL) began a 
study sponsored by the NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC) to inves-
tigate the feasibility of control sensor complement reduction through 
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the use of analytic redundancy. Specifically, the study was aimed at 
the problem of isolating the first failure in a duplex subset of the 
control sensors aboard the NASA F-8 Digital Fly-by-Wire (OFBW) air-
craft. Such a technique, if feasible, would allow operational capa-
bility following the first sensor failure, in contrast to standard 
voting techniques for failure isolation that require at least triplex 
sensors measuring a scalar quantity to provide the same single-
failure-operational capability. (1) 
During,the 2-year study period, a preliminary fault-detection 
and isolation (FOI) algorithm'was designed and coded in FORTRAN. The 
algorithm was successfully tested on the F-8 OFBW aircraft iron-bird 
simulation facility at LaRC, and it also performed well (following 
minor modification) on sensor output telemetry data from an early 
flight test, supplied by the NASA Dryden Flight Research Center 
(OFRC). (2,3,4) 
At that time, a variety of other approaches to the problem of 
sensor fault isolation via analytic redundancy had been proposed, 
including failure-sensitive filters(5,6,7) designed to enhance failure 
detectability, multiple-hypothesis techniques(8,9) involving a bank of 
filters for a wide class of failure modes, jump process formula-
, (10,11) t10ns to detect abrupt changes in the system, and innovations-
based detection systems. (12,13,14,15,16) However, it was felt that 
none of these techniques gave sufficient consideration to robustness 
in the presences of inevitable modeling errors and allowable sensor 
errors, and the multiple-hypothesis techniques and several of the 
innovations-based techniques appeared to possess innate complexity 
exceeding current-generation-aircraft flight-computer constraints. 
Therefore, based upon the relative simplicity of the preliminary CSDL 
FOI algorithm and its successful initial testing, a decision was made 
by DFRC to sponsor a program to develop an airworthy FOI algorithm, to 
program the developed algorithm on the F-8 OFBW aircraft computers, 
and to flight test the algorithm sufficiently to prove the concept of 
reliable sensor fault isolation through analytic redundancy. 
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References 17 and 18 document the mathematical development and 
software specifications, respectively, for the Phase I analytic redun-
dancy management (ARM) algorithm. As will be discussed in the follow 
ing, the ARM algorithm differs from the earlier approach(4) in the 
use of a single, comprehensive test statistic for each suspect sensor 
in place of the three test statistics required previously for a sus-
pect sensor pair. Although implemented in different ways, both stra-
tegies recognize the inherent requirement for the explicit accommoda-
tion of the effects of normal sensor errors and modeling errors on 
analytic redundancy relationships. 
The Phase I ARM algorithm was tested on seven flights between 
September 1979 and February 1980. In order to accommodate the ana-
lytic redundancy residual behavior observed on these flights, and also 
to incorporate more complete knowledge concerning the behavior of the 
onboard barometric altimeters, the Phase I ARM algorithm was modified 
to the Phase II version. In addition to parameter value changes, the 
only major coding changes in the new version involved the addition of 
first-order filters to several altimeter-related quantities and the 
addition of filter "traps" to accommodate hysteresis in the 
altimeters. 
The Phase II algorithm was initially tested on three flights 
between October 1980 and March 1981. Following analysis of the data 
from these flights, it became apparent that· the onboard attitude 
gyros, which were not representative of currently available control-
grade attitude references, did not have performance capabilities con-
sistent with ARM algorithm requirements. A particularly troublesome 
problem was the inherent difficulty in avoiding inaccurate directional 
gyro output at high roll angles, reflecting built-in gimbal-lock 
avoidance, due to the "free-azimuth" configuration of these instru-
ments. Therefore, the duplex vertical gyros and duplex directional 
gyros were replaced with duplex all-attitude platforms, whose perform-
ance proved more than adequate. 
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Phase II algorithm testing was completed with three flights dur-
ing June and July, 1981. The analysis of the data from these flights, 
as well as all previous flights, was facilitated by the use of the 
ground-edit program, a FORTRAN emulation of the actual flight code. 
This program was designed to read the sensor data stored on the down-
link tape recorder during actual or simulated flights and duplicate 
the calculations performed by the ARM flight code. The ground-edit 
program proved useful not only in verifying the flight code implemen-
tation but also in validating the effects of proposed parameter value 
and coding changes on algorithm performance. 
The Pnase II ARM algorithm performance in isolating simulated 
sensor failures injected via software during the last three flight 
tests was excellent with one exception. The algorithm had difficulty 
isolating a positive normal accelerometer bias with the aircraft in 
either a positive- or negative-roil-angle high-g turn. Following 
extensive analysis, the problem was deduced to be a -0.05 bias in each 
of the two Mach meters, which use common pressure orifices. Running 
the ground-edit program on the downlink data with the postulated Mach 
meter biases removed resulted in excellent isolation performance in 
the previously troublesome situations. 
The remainder of this report consists of four sections. Section 
2 outlines the basic structure of the ARM algorithm. Section 3 pre-
sents the details of the analytic redundancy relationships and error 
accommodation terms used in the Phase II algorithm. Section 4 pre-
sents representative results of the Phase II algorithm performance 
during the flight tests. Section 5 gives the conclusions and recom-
mendations for future work. 
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SECTION 2 
FAULT-DETECTION AND ISOLATION METHODOLOGY 
2.1 Introduction 
The analytic redundancy management algorithm is dual mode, with 
fault detection accomplished by the comparison of like-sensor outputs 
and fault isolation accomplished using modified sequential probability 
ratio tests (MSPRT) operating on analytic redundancy residuals. By 
exploiting the available duplex measurements for fault detection, the 
algorithm has high computational speed in the normal situation in 
which there are no faults. Another advantage of this dual-mode struc-
ture is that it allows the MSPRT fault-isolation tests to be made 
quite robust, since fidelity in the analytic redundancy relationships 
must be maintained for only the short time between detection and iso-
lation. 
Each MSPRT resembles a simplified generalized likelihood ratio 
test (SGLRT), (19) in which the failure time is known and the failure 
mode is assumed to be a bias of predefined magnitude whose sign is 
consistent with the difference between the duplex measurements at the 
time of failure detection. The SGLRT is a simplification of the 
full-blown GLRT that, in order to isolate a bias jump in a sensor, 
requires the calculation of the maximum likelihood estimates of both 
the failure size and failure time. The SGLRT simplifies these calcu-
lations by assuming a fixed failure size, and usually the estimate of 
failure time is restricted to lie within a window in the past. The 
duplex measurements available on the F-8 allow straightforward deter-
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mination of the failure time as discussed below, resulting in further 
simplification. The major difference between the MSPRT and the SGLRT 
is the inclusion in the former of what amounts to a decision threshold 
offset to accommodate the effects of irreducible modeling errors and 
normal sensor error characteristics in the analytic redundancy rela-
tionships. The bias failure hypothesis is used in the absence of 
detailed failure mode information because bias failures are considered 
most likely, and also because the resulting tests are quite effective, 
though not optimal, in isolating other failure types, such as ramps 
and scale factors. 
The determination of whether one or both of the duplex sensor 
outputs of a particular type will be used to determine an aircraft 
variable is based upon a hierarchy of signal status levels. In de-
creasing order of reliability, the four status levels used in the ARM 
algorithm are: unfailed, provisionally failed, conditionally failed, 
and unconditionally failed. The average of two signals having equal 
status is used, while the signal with the better status is used when 
there is a difference in status. 
Conditional and unconditional failure status declarations are 
made by analytic redundancy MSPRTs as discussed in the following. 
Provisional failure declarations are made using sensor output self test 
logic, which is included in the algorithm to minimize the effect of a 
hard-failed sensor on critical calculations. An unfailed signal is 
declared provisionally failed when it differs from its value on the 
previous sample (and from the present value of its companion signal if 
the companion's status is unfailed) by a predefined threshold magni-
tude. If this self test violation disappears on either of the next two 
samples, the provisional failure status declaration is removed and the 
signal reverts to unfailed status. 
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2.2 Fault Detection Using Direct Redundancy 
For fault detection and isolation purposes, it is convenient to 
define a faulty sensor as one having an output error magnitude larger 
than a stipulated bias failure magnitude (BFM), and in practice we 
would like to isolate an instrument having an output error magnitude 
of the order of BFM. Thus, the BFM for each signal type is chosen to 
be larger than the available instrument error specifications or the 
observed output errors in good instruments, and large enough to be 
isolated by the available analytic redundancy at cruise flight condi-
tions. A signal fault is detected when the moving window average of 
the output of instrument one minus the output of instrument two is 
larger than three-quarter BFM in magnitude. This three-quarter BFM 
threshold results in equal probabilities of detecting a BFM/2 bias (a 
false alarm) and not detecting a BFM bias (a missed alarm). 
Assuming that the noise in the instrument outputs is gaussian 
and uncorrelated from sample to sample, the number of samples in the 
moving window, N, may be chosen as follows. The standard deviation of 
the noise in the average of N samples of the difference in outputs of 
the two instruments is h/N a, where a is the standard deviation of 
the noise on a single instrument. Figure 2-1 depicts the probability 
density function for the average of. N samples in the presence of a 
BFM/2 bias. The shaded area, PF, represents the probability that 
the threshold is exceeded (a false alarm). For a value of PF of 
10-4 , gaussian distribution tables indicate that the distance from 
the threshold to the mean, BFM/4 in this case, should be equal to 3.65 
times the standard deviation of the noise. Thus 
(2-1 ) 
Because the threshold is chosen midway between BFM and BFM/2, an 
identical result follows from consideration of missed-alarm probabil-
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Figure 2-1. Probability density for average with BFM/2 bias 
ity with a failure of BFM present. For this study, sensor output 
recordings were examined to determine the values of a for the various 
sensor types, and integer window lengths were then chosen that most 
closely satisfied Eq. (2-1). The resulting values of these parameters 
are shown in Table 3-1. 
Following the detection of the failure of one instrument of a 
pair, fault isolation tests are initiated using analytic redundancy. 
In addition to the failure indication, the sign of the moving window 
average of the output of instrument one minus the output of instrument 
two is also passed to the fault isolation tests. If this sign is 
positive, either instrument one has a positive error or instrument two 
has a negative error, and the opposite situation occurs if the sign of 
the average difference is negative. This failure sign information is 
utilized by the isolation tests to decrease the amount of processing 
that must be performed. 
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2.3 Fault Isolation Using Analytic Redundancy 
The SPRT utilizes sequential observations of a process to decide 
which of two hypothesis concerning the probability distribution of the 
, (20) process 1S true. The SPRT is independent of the a priori proba-
bilities of the two hypotheses, and minimizes the average number of 
observations necessary to reach a decision while meeting prespecified 
, 1 'f' i bbil' , (21) fth d' 1 m1SC aSS1 1cat on pro a 1t1es. Because 0 ese eS1rab e 
char-acteristics and the simple form of the test when gaussian errors 
are assumed, the SPRT is an ideal candidate for use with analytic 
redundancy for fault isolation. In particular, assuming that the 
process being observed is the difference between the output of one 
suspect sensor and a synthesized output using analytic redundancy, 
appealing choices for the two hypotheses are that the process has a 
mean equivalent to a BFM-sized bias (i.e., the instrument has failed) 
or that the process has zero mean (i.e., the instrument is unfailed). 
Specifically, assume that the noises on the residual process Yk 
for instrument j (j = , or 2) at time tk are independent for all k; 
that either the failure hypothesis, H" or the no-failure hypoth-
esis, H2, is true; and that H, and H2 are the following: 
H,: Y~ is gaussian with variance 0 2 and mean ~ 
H2: Y~ is gaussian with variance 0 2 and mean 0 
It follows that the log likelihood ratio (LLR) of the joint probabil-
ity density function for n successive observations conditioned on H" 
divided by the joint probability density function for n successive 
observations conditioned on H2' is given by 
llj 
n 
n 
2 
k=' 
Y~ ) ( 2-2) 
1 1 
(Note that a is a general variable and the values in Eg. (2-1), Eg. 
(2-2), and subsequent equations are not necessarily equal.) 
Defining Pm as the probability of choosing H2 when H1 is true, 
and Pf as the probability of choosing H1 when H2 is true, then the 
SPRT optimal decision rule is given by 
pj < 15 accept H1 
n 
-
15 < pj < n take another sample n 
n < 
j 
Pn accept H2 (2-3 ) 
where 
= 
( 2-4) 
Note that if the LLR is between the two thresholds, a choice of 
hypothesis that meets the specified acceptable misclassification 
probabilities Pm and Pf cannot be made, and another sample must be 
taken. 
Unfortunately, such factors as allowable biases on unfailed sen-
sors, errors in the sensor input/output models, and parameter uncer-
tainties in analytic redundancy relationships all contribute to low-
frequency errors in analytic redundancy residual processes for un-
failed sensors. Direct application of the above SPRT to such a 
process may result in the acceptance of the failure hypothesis in 
spite of the fact that the sensor is operating within acceptable 
tolerances. 
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The MSPRT is a fault-isolation test that systematically accom-
modates those irreducible factors contributing to low-frequency ana-
lytic redundancy residual errors that cannot be explicitly removed by 
modeling. The ARM algorithm utilizes the MSPRT to make conditional 
and unconditional failure status declarations following fault detec-
tion. Underlying the technique is the assumption that either H, or 
H2 for suspect sensor j is true. Although a straightforward 
approach would be to design a decision rule such as Eq. (2-3) for each 
sensor and then declare a failure when either hypothesis for either 
sensor was accepted, a more conservative approach has been chosen that 
avoids the tenuous situation of inferring that one sensor has failed 
merely because its companion sensor appears to be unfai1ed. 
Consistent with the preceding discussion, following fault 
detection at time t,' the MSPRT test statistic, the modified log like-
lihood ratio (MLLR), is defined at time t for suspect sensor j as 
n 
= 
n [~ (~ L--
k=' 0 2 2 
and the following decision rule is used 
c5 < u
j 
n 
0 < u
j 
n 
< 0 
declare instrument j unconditionally failed, 
terminate the test 
declare instrument j conditionally failed, 
take another sample 
take another sample 
(2-5) 
(2-6) 
In Eq. (2-6), the mean ~ is computed assuming a BFM-sized bias in 
sensor j consistent with the direct redundancy moving window average 
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at the detection time. The negative threshold 0 in Eq. (2-6) is the 
original SPRT threshold calculated using prespecified misclassifica-
tion probabilities via Eq. (2-4). 
The last term in the summation in Eq. (2-5) differentiates the 
MLLR from the LLR of the standard SPRT, and represents the contribu-
tion of a postulated worst-case residual error magnitude at time t k , 
Ek , to LLR calculation. Eqs. (2-5) and (2-6) indicate that the MSPRT 
is in essence a one-sided SPRT with a threshold offset arising from 
the worst-case error term. It follows that so long as the threshold 
offset is conservative, the misclassification probabilities for the 
MSPRT will be no larger than those specified to determine the original 
SPRT threshold. (17) Th h i f th t 't d f e c a ce a e wars -case error magn~ u e or 
each analytic redundancy test requires considerable engineering 
judgement. An optimistic choice lowers the reliability of the test 
while an overly pessimistic choice may result in prohibitively long 
isolation times, although the inclusion of conditional failure 
declaration using a relaxed test criterion tends to lower the mean 
isolation times seen by the control system without corresponding 
increases in the ultimate misisolation probabilities. Specific 
choices for the worst-case error terms are discussed in Section 3. 
In addition to the decision rule of Eq. (2-6), the ARM algorithm 
avoids open-ended isolation tests by utilizing an elapsed time limit 
(ETL) for each sensor type. If ET.L is reached before an unconditional 
failure has been declared, the detected fault indication is removed, 
isolation computations cease, and the direct redundancy detection 
process is reinitiated. Because failure observability and worst-case 
error magnitude are often maneuver dependent, pilot response to 
notification that ETL for a sensor type has been reached could result 
in an enhanced fault isolation environment during the subsequent 
isolation period. Alternatively, reaching ETL could initiate hardware 
selfcheck routines. 
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2.4 False Alarm Protection 
In order to provide increased false alarm protection, a direct 
redundancy SPRT is initiated for the suspect sensor type following 
fault detection. The process examined by the DRSPRT is the output of 
instrument one minus the output of instrument two, the same process 
whose moving window average triggered the fault detection. The DRSPRT 
test statistic, the DRLLR, is given at time t as 
n 
DRLLR 
n 
n 
= L m [~ - (O~ - O~)] 
k=1 0 2 
( 2-7) 
1 2 
where Ok and Ok denote the outputs at time ~ of suspect instruments 
one and two, respectively. The mean m in Eq. (2-7) has a magnitude 
equal to BFM, and its sign is the sign of the moving window average at 
the time of fault detection. Whenever the DRLLR crosses the specified 
positive threshold, indicating that a difference between the two 
instrument outputs of BFM magnitude with the stipulated sign does not 
exist, the analytic redundancy fault isolation tests are terminated 
and the direct redundancy fault detection test is reinitiated. 
In addition to providing protection against false alarms, the 
DRSPRT also performs a "rapid reset" function when the failure's ob-
servability decreases following fault detection, as an alternative to 
waiting until ETL is reached. As will be illustrated in flight test 
results shown in Section 4, this reset capability is particularly use-
ful as an aid to isolating scale-factor failures when the instrument's 
input changes sign following fault detection, and it allows the simple 
bias-failure-hypothesis-based isolation tests to perform quite effect-
ively in these situations. 
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2.5 Summary 
To summarize the ARM FDI process, each signal type utilizes a 
threshold test on the moving window average of the difference in the 
duplex signals to detect a fault. Following fault detection, one MLLR 
is computed via Eq. (2-5) for each suspect sensor for each form of 
analytic redundancy used, and the MSPRT threshold logic of Eq. (2-6) 
is applied to the lowest MLLR. This process is repeated until an un-
conditional failure is declared or ETL is reached. Additionally, a 
direct redundancy LLR is computed as shown in Eq. (2-7) following 
fault detec~ion to provide false alarm protection. Finally, signal 
self test is continuously performed for all signals having unfailed 
status. 
16 
SECTION 3 
FAULT ISOLATION TEST DETAILS 
3.1 Introduction 
The ARM algorithm monitors ten duplex instruments aboard the F-8 
DFBW aircraft: longitudinal accelerometer, lateral accelerometer, 
normal accelerometer, roll rate gyro, pitch rate gyro, yaw rate gyro, 
attitude platform, barometric altimeter, Mach meter, and alpha vane. 
(Although the accelerometer and rate gyro complement is triplex, only 
a duplex subset is utilized by the ARM algorithm.) Additionally, a 
simplex beta vane is used in some calculations, but not monitored for 
failure. Each attitude platform gives outputs of Euler roll angle, ~, 
pitch angle, a, and azimuth angle, ~, and these outputs are considered 
to be three independent signal types although, in practice, the 
failure of one channel would probably dictate the failure of the unit. 
Table 3-1 indicates relevant Phase II ARM parameters for the 12 
signal types being monitored. As is discussed later in this section, 
the mechanization of the MSPRTs for the Mach meters, altimeters, and 
attitude platforms is such that there is no ETL or DRLLR associated 
with these signal types. The ARM algorithm sample period is 0.06 
second. 
From the large number of analytic redundancy relationships 
available, practical considerations and aircraft-specific signal-to-
noise values reduce the number used in the ARM algorithm to four gen-
eral types: rotational kinematics, altitude kinematics, translational 
17 
00 Table 3-1. Phase II ARM signal parameters. 
Signal Type Symbol BFM Self test DRLLR ETL Window 
'lbreshold Variance (Samples) Length 
Mach M 0.05 0.1 --- --- 3 
Altitude h 76.2 m 304.8 m --- --- 5 
Angle of attack 0.035 rad 0.1 rad 2 250 a 0.00005 rad 9 
Longitudinal Ax 0.2 g 0.5 0.002 g 2 1000 10 g 
acceleration 
Lateral Ay 0.2 g 0.5 g 0.002 2 500 10 g 
acceleration 
Normal Az 0.2 g 1.0 9 0.002 2 500 10 g 
acceleration 
Roll rate 0.087 rad/s 0.00005 2 2 133 3 P 1.0 rad/s rad /s 
Pitch rate 0.035 rad/s 0.25 rad/s 0.00001 2 2 133 q rad /s 2 
0.035 rad/s 0.25 rad/s 0.00001 2 2 133 2 Yaw rate r rad /s 
Roll angle cjI 0.087 rad 0.6 rad --- --- 6 
Pitch angle 6 0.087 rad 0.2 rad --- --- 6 
Yaw angle 1jI 0.087 rad 0.2 rad --- --- 6 
kinematics, and translational dynamics. In the following four sec-
tions, the analytic redundancy residual equations and worst-case error 
terms are discussed for each sensor type, grouped by the type of ana-
lytic redundancy employed. The lateral and normal accelerometers em-
ploy two types of analytic redundancy each while the remaining signal 
types employ one each. 
Before proceeding to the details of the analytic redundancy cal-
culations, the compensation performed on particular sensor outputs 
will be discussed. The compensated instruments include the accelero-
meters, the alpha and beta vanes, and the Mach meters. 
The accelerometers are compensated in order to transform their 
readings to the acceleration at the aircraft center of mass. Using a 
tilde (_) to denote uncompensated sensor output, the compensated read-
. f th . th 1 . d· 1 1 tId I I t 1ng o. e] ong1tu 1na, a era, an norma acce erome er ~re 
computed as follows 
(3-1) 
• • Ayj Ayj 2 
= - 1 (r + pq) +1yP + 1 p ( 3-2) x z 
• . Az j izj 2 
'"' 
+ 1 (q - prj 
- 1.? + 1 p (3-3) x z 
where 1. , 1. , and t denote the displacement in body axes of the sen-
x y z 
sar package from the center of mass. Eq. (3-1) through (3-3) repre-
th · f th . (22) .. f sent e dOm1nant terms rom e exact express10ns, cons1st1ng 0 
those terms involving the longest distance, t , the roll rate, or the 
x 
roll acceleration. The angular acceleration terms in these compensa-
tion equations are computed by simple back-differencing in the ARM 
algorithm. 
19 
The alpha and beta vane readings are compensated for their dis-
tance from the center of mass and for bias, with the compensated read-
ings of the single beta vane and the jth alpha vane computed as 
B = B - dE.- Bb V (3-4) 
a
j 
= 
~j +d's'- ~ V (3-5) 
where d is the longitudinal distance from the center of mass to the 
vanes and V is the total air-relative velocity computed using the Mach 
number and the velocity of sound computed as a function of alti-
tUde.(18) The compensated readings of the jth Mach meter and the rud-
der position transducer are computed as 
= (3-6) 
R = R - lb . (3-7) 
The values of the various compensation parameters mentioned 
above are given in Table 3-2. Supersonic flight is defined as the 
region where the first-order-filtered,. uncompensated, voted.Mach 
signal exceeds 1.0. The time constant of this filter is 0.5 second. 
Table 3-2. Compensation parameters. 
.t R. R. d Bb Rb Mb ~ (rad) x y z 
(m) (m) (m) (m) (rad) (rad) Super- Other- Super- Other-
sonic wise sonic wise 
6.42 0.31 0.17 11.0 -0.0087 0.0209 -0.01 -0.05 0.014 0 
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In addition to these compensations, each rate gyro is compen-
sated for bias by subtracting a bias estimate that is updated using 
analytic redundancy residuals. This process is discussed in the next 
section. 
3.2 Rotational Kinematics 
Rotational kinematics (RK) is used for fault isolation in the 
rate gyros and attitude platforms. The roll, pitch, and yaw rate 
gyros provide measurements of the aircraft body rates p, q, and r 
about the aircraft x, y, and z axes, respectively; and these body 
rates are related to the rates of change of the Euler angles measured 
by the attitude platforms. Thus, following a rate gyro fault detec-
tion at time t 1 , the RK residual for instrument j of the suspect type 
is calculated at general time ~ using the appropriate equation from 
the following 
k 
= L {PijT - [~~ - ~i-1 - (1/1. - 1/1. 1) sin ~~]} i=1 ... ~ ~- ... 
( 3-8) 
k 
L 
i=1 
(3-9) 
k 
= L {r~T - [-(9. - 9 ) sin ~~ i=1 ~ ~ i-1 ... 
( 3-1 0) 
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In Eq. (3-8) - (3-10) and all subsequent equations, T is the ARM 
sample period of 0.06 second and an overbar indicates that the quan-
tity represents the average of its present and previous sample values. 
This averaging is used to reduce computational errors during high 
angular rate maneuvers, and the forms of Eq. (3-8) - (3-10) avoid 
differentation of the noisy attitude measurements. Variables with no 
"j n superscript represent voted values obtained using the status level 
logic discussed in Section 2.1. 
At every sample time ~, following fault detection, the residual 
for each suspect rate gyro is used to update its MLLR usingEq. (2-5), 
where the mean has magnitude equal to the rate gyro BFM times (~ -
t ), the variance reflects attitude gyro noise variance, and the 
o 
worst-case error is computed as the sum of the magni·tudes of terms 
reflecting initial attitude gyro noise, roll attitude bias times pitch 
rate, rate gyro misalignment, and rate gyro scale factor error. Table 
3-3 indicates the values of these parameters in the Phase II ARM code. 
Table 3-3. Rate gyro rotational kinematics test parameters. 
Rate Variance Initial Scale Roll Cross-axis 
Gyro 2 Attitude Factor Attitude Misalignment 
Type (rad ) Noise Error Bias (rad) 
(rad) (rad) 
Roll 0.0004 0.01 0.05 
---
0.02 
pitch 0.0004 0.005 0.05 0.057 0.02 
Yaw 0.0004 0.005 0.05 0.057 0.02 
As was done for all signal types, the contributions to be used 
in the rate gyro RK MLLR worst-case error terms were initially chosen 
by examining the variational equations for the analytic redundancy 
. d 1 (17) d l' . . . d 11 th reSl ua s an app ylng englneerlng JU gement. Natura y, e 
22 
final forms of the error terms and their coefficient magnitudes were 
strongly influenced by the flight test data. 
Because of the sensitivity of the translational kinematics rela-
tionship, used for longitudinal and normal accelerometer fault isola-
tion, to angular rate estimation errors, the rotational kinematics 
residuals given by Eq. (3-8) through (3-10) are used to estimate 
biases in the individual rate gyros. At the beginning of each cycle, 
these estimates are subtracted from the sensor outputs before they are 
used in any calculations. The general form of the bias update equa-
tion at time tk is 
biask _1 + 0.001 y/T (3-11) 
£eflecting an estimator time constant of approximately 2 minutes. 
These rate gyro bias update equations are bypassed whenever the roll 
or pitch attitude angle exceeds 0.2 rad in magnitude. During flight 
tests, the bias estimators have accurately compensated for biases of 
the order of 0.008 rad/s observed in the pitch rate gyros. 
Treating the roll, pitch, and yaw attitude signals from a single 
platform as independent signal types, the RK residual for signal j of 
an attitude type (~, e, w) having a detected fault is calculated at 
time tk as follows 
'Yk(,j) 
k {~i j L 
- ~i-1 - [P.T + (W. -W· 1) sin e. ]} i=1 1. 1. 1.- 1. 
(3-12) 
Y k (e j ) 
k 
{e? j 
"" L ei _1 - T [Cii cos ~. - r. sin ~i]} i=1 1. 1. 1. 
( 3-13) 
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= 
k 
L 
i=1 
{111~ - 111~ 1 - [( ~ . - ~. 1 - P. T) ~ 1- 1 ~- ~ 
• sin 9i + T(q. sin ~. + ri cos ~.) cos e.]} 1 ~ ~ 1 
(3-14) 
In order to calculate the attitude gyro MLLRs, it is necessary to have 
stored the instantaneous RK residuals, corresponding to the terms en-
closed in braces in Eq. (3-12) through (3-14), in a moving window of 
the same length as the detector window for each signal type. At the 
time of fault detection, the instantaneous residual window for each 
suspect signal is procesed using the appropriate equation from Eq. 
(3-12) through (3-14) to form the MLLR residual for each window time, 
where t1 corresponds to the time associated with the oldest window 
element. The MLLRs are computed at each intermediate window time 
using Eq. (2-5). The MLLR mean has BFM magnitude, the variance is of 
the order of the attitude gyro noise variance, and the worst-case 
error is the sum of the magnitudes of terms reflecting initial atti-
tude gyro error, rate gyro bias, rate gyro misalignment, and roll rate 
gyro scale factor error. The values of the attitude platform RK test 
parameters for the Phase II algorithm are given in Table 3-4. 
After processing the entire window of instantaneous residuals 
and calculating the MLLRs corresponding to the present time, the 
threshold logic of Eq. (2-6) is applied to the lower MLLR. If no un-
conditional failure declaration is made, the detected failure indica-
tion is removed and the detection process proceeds smoothly on the 
next sample. 
The framework used for the attitude signals of processing a 
stored window of instantaneous residuals before applying the MSPRT 
threshold logic is also utilized for the Mach meters and altimeters, 
and these five signal types do not require direct redundancy LLR cal-
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Table 3-4. Attitude signal rotational kinematics test parameters. 
Roll 
Inertial Roll Pitch Yaw Misalignment Misalignment Misalignment Rate 
Attitude Rate Rate Rate Toward Toward Toward Scale 
Variance Noise Bias Bias Bias Roll Axis Pitch Axis Yaw Axis Factor 
Signal Type 2 (rad ) (rad) (rad/s) (rad/s) (rad/s) (rad) (rad) (rad) Error 
Roll 0.000025 0.01 0.031 --- --- --- 0.02 --- 0.02 
Pitch 0.000025 0.005 --- 0.02 0.02 0.02 --- 0.02 ---
Yaw 0.000025 0.005 0.031 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 --- ---
culations since the isolation process does not extend beyond the time 
of detection. Additionally, the MLLR for any signal of these five 
types is reset to zero whenever it becomes positive. This is done to 
accommodate the uncertainty in failure time within the window, and 
requires a slightly higher magnitude threshold for the MSPRTs for 
these sensor types. (11) For the 10-4 misclassification probabilities 
used in this study, the threshold 0 in Eq. (2-6) is -11.4 for these 
five signal types and -9.2 for the others. 
In order to make the fault detection tests consistent with the 
fault identification tests, which are sensitive only to bias changes 
in the attitude, Mach, and altimeter signals, the elements whose 
moving window averages are used for fault detection for these five 
signal types are calculated as the deviations in output difference 
from the difference most recently discarded from the window. 
3.3 Translational Kinematics 
Translational kinematics (TK) refers to the redundancy between 
changes in aircraft air-relative velocity measured by the air data 
sensors and changes in aircraft velocity obtained by integrating the 
acceleration computed using the inertial sensor outputs. The ARM 
algorithm utilizes TK to isolate faults in the longitudinal accelero-
meters, normal accelerometers, and Mach meters. 
The TK residual for longitudinal accelerometer j at time tk, 
following a detected fault at time t1' is given by 
k 
L 
i=1 
T[AX~ 
~ 
(3-15) 
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where g is the acceleration of gravity, Vs is the speed of sound, 
periodically recomputed as a function of altitude, and a, a, and Mare 
the angle of attack, sideslip angle, and Mach number, respectively. 
(In Eq. (3-15) and all subsequent equations involving air-relative 
velocity, cos a is approximated as unity and therefore does not appear 
explicitly. Similarly, with a and a measured in radians, the ARM 
algorithm approximates sin a, sin a, and cos a as a, a, and 
(1 - a 2/2), respectively.) In the MLLR calculations, the ~an at 
time ~ has magnitude equal to the longitudinal accelerometer BFM 
times (tk - to) the variance reflects air data sensor noise, and the 
worst-case error is the sum of the magnitudes of terms reflecting 
initial air data noise, a wind-shear doublet, misalignment of the 
suspect accelerometer, and transonic Mach meter behavior. 
The TK residual for normal accelerometer j at time t k , follow-
ing fault detection at time t 1, is given by 
k 
= L T[AZi - cos 8i cos ~i g i=1 
Vs M sin a ] (3-16) 
o 0 0 
The MLLR mean has magnitude equal to the normal accelerometer BFM 
times (tk - to)' the variance reflects air data sensor noise, and the 
worst-case error is the sum of the magnitudes of terms reflecting 
initial air data noise, a wind-shear doublet, suspect accelerometer 
scale-factor error, and pitch rate gyro scale-factor error. 
The wind-shear doublet magnitude and MLLR variance for the lon-
gitudinal and normal accelerometers each assume one of two values de-
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pending upon the binary output of a wind turbulence filter operating 
on lateral channel TK residuals, analogous to Eq. (3-15) and (3-16). 
These residuals are high-pass filtered, squared, low-pass filtered, 
and then passed through a two-level turbulence flag logic with hyster-
esis. Figure 3-1 indicates a block diagram of the calculation of the 
wind turbulence estimate, VAREST, and the turbulence flag logic. 
Table 3-5 shows the values of the associated parameters, with the 
values of K1 and K2 reflecting equal 5 second time constants for the 
high-pass and low-pass filters.(4) 
Ay + CO. 6 iin4i 9 + v. M(p sin Q - r COl Q) 
VI M lin (3 
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Figure 3-1. Block diagram of turbulence estimator 
Table 3-5. Turbulence estimator parameters 
VARLCM VARHI 
K1 K2 (m2/s 2) (m2/s 2) 
0.9881 0.0119 0.464 0.743 
TURBULENCE 
FLAG 
Table 3-6 lists the values of the longitudinal and normal accel-
erometer TK test parameters used in the Phase II ARM algorithm. A 
scale-factor error term for pitch rate is employed instead of a rate 
bias term in the normal accelerometer test for three reasons. First, 
it reflects the excellent performance of the rate gyro bias estima-
tors. Second, it reflects the existence of an observed scale-factor 
error in the number two pitch rate gyro of approximately -0.05. 
Third, the form of this term also allows accommodation of uncompen-
sated Mach bias. The transonic region is defined as values of the 
filtered, uncompensated, voted Mach signal between 0.92 and 1.04. 
The TK residual for Mach meter j is calculated at time ik as 
k 
I 
i=1 
(3-17) 
As for the attitude gyros discussed earlier, the instantaneous resid-
uals for each Mach meter, the terms in braces in Eq. (3-17), are 
stored in a moving window. At the time a Mach meter fault is detect-
ed, each sensor's instantaneous residual window is processed using 
Eq. (3-17) to compute its TK residual at the intermediate window 
times, and simultaneously Eq. (2-5) is used to compute each Mach 
meter's MLLR, with the threshold logic of Eq. (2-6) applied to the 
lower MLLR following complete window processing. The MLLR mean has 
magnitude equal to the Mach meter BFM times Vs cos a at the time of 
detection, the variance reflects the effect of Mach meter noise, and 
the worst-case error is the sum of terms arising from initial Mach 
meter error and acceleration uncertainty. Table 3-7 indicates the 
values of these parameters used in the Phase II code. 
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IN 
o 
Type 
Ax 
Az 
Variance 
Low 
Turb. 
9.29 
9.29 
Table 3-6. Accelerometer translational kinematics test parameters. 
(m2/s 2) 
Pitch Doublet 
Transonic Supersonic Rate 
Initial Scale Alignment Error Error Scale Magnitude (g) 
High Noise Factor Error Rate Jump Factor Duration 
Turb. (m/s) Error (rad) (g) (m/s) Error (s) Low High 
Turb. Turb. 
33.4 1.52 
---
0.03 0.031 -30.5 --- 12 0.155 0.31 
33.4 1.52 0.02 --- --- --- 0.035 12 0.155 0.31 
Table 3-7. Mach meter translational kinematics test parameters. 
Variance Acceleration Initial Noise (m/s) 
(m2 Is 2) 2 Error (m/s ) Transonic Otherwise 
27.9 4.0 30.5 1.52 
3.4 Translational Dynamics 
Translational dynamics (TO) refers to the redundancy between the 
acceleration of the aircraft measured by the accelerometers and the 
acceleration predicted by stored aerodynamic coefficient fUnctions 
using air data sensor measurements. TO residuals are used by the ARM 
algorithm to isolate failures in the lateral aceelerometers and alpha 
vanes. 
The TO residual for lateral accelerometer j at time ~ is given 
by 
(3-18) 
where CYB and CYDR are stored lateral coefficient fUnctions of Mach 
. and alpha, Q is computed dynamic pressure, S is the surface area of 
the wing, and m is the estimated aircraft mass. The absence of fuel 
tank level measurement inputs to the onboard computers precludes auto-
matic mass estimate update. As a compromise between accuracy and 
operational complexity, the current technique requires pilot selection 
of which of three mass estimates is used on the basis of cockpit (or 
telemetry) indications of fuel remaining. 
On every sample following fault detection, the residuals given 
by Eq. (3-18) are used in Eq. (2-5) to compute the lateral accelero-
meter TO MLLRs. The TO MLLR mean has lateral accelerometer BFM magni-
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tude, the variance reflects air data noise, and the worst-case error 
is the sum of the magnitudes of terms reflecting the effects of beta 
vane bias, lateral accelerometer misalignment, neglected lateral co-
efficients, and scale-factor error in the computed aerodynamic side-
force. The values of these parameters used in the Phase II ARM code 
are shown in Table 3-8. 
Table 3-8. Lateral accelerometer translational dynamics 
test parameters. 
Variance Neglected 
(m2/s4) Beta Scale Coefficients 
Bias Misalignment Factor 
Low High (rad) (rad) Error p/V 
Turbulence Turbulence (m) Aileron 
0.93 3.72 0.002 0.02 0.2 1.63 0.052 
The TO residual for alpha vane j at time tk is given by 
= cos (3-19) 
where the lift, L, and drag, D, are computed using each alpha vane 
output individually in stored fUnctions of Mach, elevator position, 
and angle of attack. The alpha vane TO MLLR mean has magnitude equal 
to the alpha vane BFM times the magnitude of the computed TO residual 
gradient, the variance assumes one of two values depending upon indi-
cated turbulence level, and the worst-case error is the sum of the 
magnitudes of terms reflecting the effects of normal accelerometer 
scale factor error and aerodynamic coefficient error. Table 3-9 indi-
cates the values of these parameters used in the Phase II code. The 
"good fit" region for the aerodynamic coefficient error contribution 
for alpha vane j is currently defined by the following two inequali-
ties 
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-0.175 < 0 < 0.0872 
e 
-0.07 < < (0.42 - 0.232 M) (3-20) 
where 0 is the measured elevator position in radians. The total 
e 
contribution of aerodynamic coefficient error is currently calculated 
as 0.6 times the sum of the two individual vane contributions. 
Table 3-9. Alpha vane translational dynamics test parameters. 
Variance Aerodynamic Coefficient 
(m 2 Is 4) Contribution 2 (m/s ) 
Accelerometer 
Scale Factor Otherwise 
Low High Error Good 
Turbulence Turbulence Fit M < 0.8 M > 0.8 
-
18.6 37.2 0.1 M2+0.305M 0.3048 + 19.5 
(5. 52M-l. 66) 2 
Table 3-10 lists the lift, drag, and sideforce aerodynamic coef-
ficient functional representations. The lift coefficient is formed by 
linear interpolation between the values calculated at the two Mach 
break" points bracketing the Mach estimate~ there are ten Mach 
breakpoints between 0.18 and 1.9. The complete drag coefficient is 
formed as the sum of CD and CDDE. 
3.5 Altitude Kinematics 
Altitude kinematics (AK) refers to the redundancy between the 
changes in altitude measured by the altimeters and changes in altitude 
computed from the vertical acceleration measured by the accelerome-
ters. This vertical acceleration at time t. is computed as 
1. 
33 
Table 3-10. Functional representation of aerodynamic coefficients. 
Aerodynamic 
Coefficient 
CL 
CD 
CODE 
CYB 
CYDR 
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Polynomial 
For Mach 8 M., j = 1,10 
J 
CL~ 
CD~ 
CD = 
m 
CODE 
CYB = 
m 
CYDR = 
+ M(a 
4 
2 3 
+ a a + a a + a a ) 
5 6 7 
Range 
a < 0.1745 
0.1745 < a < 0.2094 
0.2094 < a 
0.18 < M < 0.9 
0.9<M<1.2 
1.2<M<1.9 
0.1 A < M < 0.9 
O.9<M<1.2 
1.2<M<1.9 
Av. Ax. sin ai - (Ay1.' sin~. + Az. cos ~.) cos a. - g 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 
(3-21 ) 
Examination of Eq. (3-21) indicates that, depending upon the orienta-
tion of the aircraft, an AK test could be used to isolate a failure in 
an altimeter, any type of accelerometer, and the pitch and roll output 
channels of the attitude platform1 the ARM algorithm contains AK tests 
for isolation of failures in the lateral and normal accelerometers and 
the altimeters. 
During initial ARM algorithm design, it was anticipated that the 
AK test would be the most powerful test for isolating normal accelero-
meter failures at shallow bank angles. At that time, the major source 
of error in the altimeters, except during transonic flight, was 
thought to be the 3.4 m output quantization. (4) However, during the 
flight testing of the Phase I ARM code, significant unexpected errors 
were found in the AK residuals during simulated accelerometer fail-
ures. Discussion with DFRC personnel revealed that earlier attempts 
to model the observed behavior of these altimeters had resulted in a 
model containing a first-order lag with a time constant of 0.5 second 
and hysteresis of uncertain magnitude between 10 m and 30 m. 
Because of the uncertainty associated with the altimeter hyster-
esis, it was decided that no attempt would be made to model this 
effect in the Phase II algorithm. Instead, "traps" were added to the 
AK filters integrating Eq. (3-21) that bypass the incorporation of 
altitude measurement residuals smaller than a stipulated magnitude, 
and the worst-case error terms corresponding to initial altimeter 
error were increased significantly to accommodate the observed hyster-
esis effects. In addition, the vertical acceleration given by Eq. 
(3-21), computed using inertial instrument data, is passed through a 
first-order lag, with a O.S-second time constant, before being 
dOUble integrated and compared with the altimeter outputs. 
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The relatively large initial error term required to accommodate 
barometric altimeter hysteresis error in the AK tests renders the 
effectiveness of the Phase II AK tests inferior to that of the TK and 
TO tests in isolating failed accelerometers. Additionally, the altim-
eter fault-isolation performance achieved with the AK test, which is 
sensitive only to change in altimeter bias and not absolute bias 
level, could be obtained just as reliably via signal self test. For 
these reasons, the details of the AK test implementation are not 
discussed here. The interested reader is referred to References 4 and 
24 for additional information on the formation of AK test residuals. 
3.6 Computational Requirements 
The Phase II ARM algorithm occupies approximately 8000 16-bit 
words of computer memory. Bench tests have indicated that its timing 
requirements are approximately 5.6 ms per 60 ms with no detected 
faults and approximately 12 ms per 60 ms with 12 detected faults. The 
longest timing requirement for a single detected failure is approxi-
mately 7.0 ms per 60 ms. The bulk of the timing requirement with no 
detected faults represents the overhead associated with sensor read 
and scaling; moving window fault detection processing; aircraft state 
determination; sensor output self test; analytic redundancy residual 
calculations for the Mach meters, altimeters, rate gyros, and attitude 
platforms; and the turbulence estimator. If the AK tests for normal 
and lateral accelerometers were removed, as suggested by the flight 
test results, together with all research-specific operations, the 
timing and memory figures could be lowered by approximately ten 
percent. 
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SECTION 4 
FLIGHT TEST RESULTS 
The ARM algorithm has been implemented in the F-8 DFBW aircraft 
computers in a parallel mode in which it is able to obtain all re-
quired sensor and effector position readings, but its sensor signal 
status information does not affect the choice of signals used in con-
trol law calculations; these choices continue to be made by the base-
line FOI programs. The ARM software includes extensive error simula-
tion and signal fault insertion capability, controlled by the pilot 
through the computer input panel (CIP), to allow inflight evaluation 
of ARM algorithm performance. 'Simulated signal faults that can be in-
serted (on the number one instruments only) include bias, drift, 
scale-factor error, hardover, transient pulse, and loss of signal. 
Errors that can be simulated include scale-factor errors in the normal 
and lateral aerodynamic coefficients CL and CYE, error in the assumed 
center of mass location, and misalignment of the number two rate gyro 
and accelerometer triads. In addition, the choice of which of three 
stored aircraft mass values is used in the ARM TO calculations is up-
dated, on the basis of fuel remaining, by the pilot via CIP entry. 
In addition to the excellent performance of the Phase II algo-
rithm in identifying inserted sensor failures during flight testing, 
as will be discussed, the Phase I ARM algorithm performed well when 
confronted with two actual inflight failure situations. In one in-
stance, an opening developed in the potentiometer for alpha vane two. 
The ARM algorithm declared alpha vane two unconditionally failed 24 
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seconds before the baseline code, which by itself cannot isolate the 
failed sensor of a duplex set, detected the alpha vane fault. Figure 
4-1 shows the behavior of the Phase I ARM algorithm during this in-
flight failure, with the aircraft at an altitude of 12 km and Mach 
1.05. The first frame shows the voted, compensated normal accelero-
meter output of approximately -0.9 g. The second frame shows the two 
alpha vane readings, the third frame shows the TO residuals for each 
vane and the TO worst-case error magnitude, and the fourth frame shows 
the TD MLLR for each vane. Note that following the declaration of 
alpha vane two as conditionally failed at the time of detection, the 
fault isolation process is delayed by the output spike on alpha vane 
two on sample 14. This spike drives alpha vane two out of the 
aerodynamic coefficient error "good fit n region, analogous to Eq. 
(3-20), that was used in the Phase I algorithm. This, in turn, in-
creases the magnitude of the TO worst-case error magnitude on that 
sample, and each TO MLLR is incremented by a large positive amount. 
With the removal of the alpha vane 2 output spike, the isolation pro-
cess proceeds steadily, ending with the declaration of alpha vane two 
as unconditionally failed on sample 28. It should be noted that this 
and similar experiences with the alpha vane TO tests during the flight 
test program indicated that the "good fit" region in the Phase I algo-
rithm was conservatively narrow. This resulted in the larger region, 
defined by Eq. (3-20), being used in the Phase II algorithm. 
The second inflight malfunction occurred when the baseline sys-
tem detected the memory parity failure of one of the triplex computers 
and declared it failed. Because the failed computer was dedicated to 
reading the number one sensor outputs and because of the mechanization 
of the buffer refreshing operation, the computer loss manifested it-
self to the ARM algorithm as all number one signals jumping to their 
negative maximum values. ARM sensor output self test immediately de-
clared all number one signals provisionally failed, and the analytic 
redundancy tests declared all number one signals unconditionally 
failed within 1.3 seconds of the computer failure. 
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Table 4-1 indicates the performance of the Phase II ARM algo-
rithm in isolating inserted bias, drift, and hardover failures, with 
the aircraft near trim at Mach 0.6 at 6100 m altitude. These isola-
tion times are in excellent agreement with theoretical values calcu-
lated for the MLLR residuals and worst-case error terms in a 1 g non-
maneuvering environment. In all cases, sensor output self test imme-
diately declared a hardover sensor provisionally failed. It is 
important to note that between the times of failure insertion and 
fault isolation, the average of the two sensor outputs would be used 
in control calculations, thus halving the effective error. The fault 
isolation times shown in Table 4-1 are also representative of the in-
jected failure isolation times observed with the aircraft undergoing 
moderate maneuvers. 
Because of the variety of worst-case error terms in the differ-
ent analytic redundancy tests, a summary of inserted fault isolation 
performance during extreme maneuvers similar to Table 4-1 is not pos-
sible. However, Figures 4-2 through 4-7 indicate representative 
results, both with and without simulated errors in the knowledge of 
important aircraft parameters. 
Each of these figures contains four different frames, and three 
of these frames present analogous information in the different fig-
ures. One frame shows the two suspect signals, including the simu-
lated failure. One frame contains the residual for each suspect 
signal and the worst-case error term for the particular type of ana-
lytic redundancy used: RK for the rate' gyros and attitude platforms; 
TO for the alpha vanes and lateral accelerometers; and TK for the 
longitudinal accelerometers, normal accelerometers, and Mach meters. 
Finally, one frame contains the MLLR for each suspect signal. 
Figure 4-2 indicates isolation of a simulated 0.5 scale factor 
in pitch rate gyro one. During the early negative pitch rate man-
euver, the failure is detected but it cannot be isolated before the 
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Figure 4-1. Actual failure of alpha vane two. 
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Figure 4-2. Pitch rate gyro one simulated 0.5 
scale factor. 
Table 4-1. Inserted fault average isolation times 
at trim (seconds). 
1.5 
BFM BFM/s 
Signal Type Bias Drift Hardover 
Mach 0.06 NT 0 
Altimeter 0.12 NT 0 
Angle of attack 0.54 2.1 0.12 
Long. accel. 7.26 3.6 0.78 
Lat. accel. 0.3 1.38 0 
Norma 1 acce 1. 6.51 3.84 0.36 
Roll rate 0.48 1.44 0.06 
Pitch rate 0.9 1.8 0.24 
Yaw rate 0.9 1.8 0.24 
Roll attitude 0.18 NT 0 
Pitch attitude 0.12 NT 0 
Yaw attitude 0.18 NT 0 
NT = no test 
magnitude of the pitch rate decreases to the extent that the differ-
ence betwen the two pitch rate signals becomes insignificant. This 
forces the DRLLR to exceed the +9.2 threshold, removing the detected 
failure flag and reinitializing the detection process. (With the de-
tected failure flag removed, all of the variables associated with 
fault isolation remain unchanged.) During the subsequent positive 
pitch rate maneuver, the fault is again detected, and instrument one 
is declared conditionally failed in six samples and unconditionally 
failed 12 samples later. 
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Figure 4-3 shows the successful isolation of a simulated 0.053 
rad/s bias in pitch rate gyro one during a positive roll rate maneu-
ver, with a simulated misalignment of the number two pitch rate gyro 
0.02 rad about the aircraft yaw axis. The effect of the roll maneuver 
acting through the misalignment can be seen as a negative ramp in the 
RK residual for pitch rate gyro two in the third frame of the figure. 
However, it is important to note that the magnitude of this residual 
is always less than the postulated worst-case error magnitude, also 
shown in the third frame. Therefore, although the sign of the resid-
ual in pitch rate gyro two is consistent with the sign of the detected 
failure (positive for instrument one or negative for instrument two), 
the RK MLLR for pitch rate gyro two remains positive throughout the 
failure simulation. The plot of the MLLR for pitch rate gyro one in-
dicates that it is declared conditionally failed 14 samples after 
failure injection and declared unconditionally failed 8 samples later. 
Figure 4-4 shows the successful isolation of a simulated 0.3 g 
bias in lateral accelerometer one, with the TO calculations utilizing 
a value for the lateral aerodynamic coefficient CYe 0.9 times the com-
puted value. During this test, the aircraft has a sideslip angle of 
0.05 rad and a dynamic pressure of 22.5 kPa (470 Ib/ft2 ). The use of 
a low CYB results in TO residuals for the two lateral accelerometers 
that are lower than they would normally be, and this is clearly evi-
dent in the figure as a negative bias in the residual for instrument 
two. Although the sign of this bias is consistent with the sign of 
the detected failure, it is smaller in magnitude than the worst-case 
error term, and the MLLR for instrument two remains positive. As in-
dicated by its MLLR, lateral accelerometer one is declared condition-
ally failed three samples after failure injection and is declared un-
conditionally failed five samples later. 
Figure 4-5 shows the successful isolation of a simulated 0.053 
rad bias in alpha vane one, with the TO calculations utilizing a value 
for the lift coefficient 0.9 times the computed value. The aircraft 
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is executing a 3.4 g turn at Mach 0.83 at an altitude of 5.4 km. The 
effect of the erroneous lift coefficient is reflected in residuals for 
the two alpha vanes that are more positive than they would normally 
be, and this can be seen as a positive bias in the residual for un-
failed alpha vane two. Although this residual has a sign consistent 
with the sign of the detected failure, it is smaller than the postu-
lated worst-case error magnitude. Thus, the MLLR for alpha vane two 
remains positive, while alpha vane one is declared conditionally 
failed five samples after failure insertion and is declared uncondi-
tionally failed fives samples later. 
Although this example shows correct alpha vane fault isolation 
by the ARM algorithm in spite of a ten percent error in calculated 
lift coefficient, this is not always the case throughout the air-
craft's flight envelope. However, although some situations have been 
observed during 1.5 BFM bias insertions in which the ARM algorithm is 
unable to decide which alpha vane has failed, no instances of misiso-
lation of the unfailed vane have been encountered with ten percent 
lift coefficient error. The observed instances of fault isolation in-
decision occur at high angles of attack, where the polynomial lift 
coefficient functions are known to be less accurate than at the lower 
angles of attack. This knowledge is reflected in the "good fit" 
region defined by Eq. (3-20). Improved alpha vane fault isolation 
performance could be obtained by using more complex lift coefficient 
models than those shown in Table 3-9, with corresponding decreases in 
the contribution of coefficient error to the worst-case error term. 
Additional improvement in TO fault isolation test accuracy could 
be obtained through a more refined mass estimate update procedure. 
The current technique of using one of three stored mass estimates on 
the basis of pilot selection can, even when executed properly, result 
in TO residual error for a lateral accelerometer or alpha vane as 
large as five percent of the true lateral acceleration or normal 
acceleration, respectively. 
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The high-frequency oscillation in the compensated normal accel-
eration shown in the first frame of Figure 4-5, with a magnitude of 
approximately 0.3 g, is a manifestation of actual airframe flexure 
arising from what is termed "high alpha buffet." Unfortunately, the 
currently programmed ARM method of computing angular acceleration by 
simple back-differencing of the voted angular rates, when used in 
compensation Eq. (3-3), results in a term that is in phase with the 
accelerometer oscillations. In fact, the magnitude of the oscilla-
tions in the compensation term and the raw accelerometer output are 
approximately equal. Because of the high frequency of the oscillation 
in compensated normal acceleration, its overly large magnitude has not 
created any problems in the TO isolation tests, which are much more 
sensitive to low-frequency errors. If desired, the oscillation in the 
compensation term could be effectively eliminated by computing the 
angular acceleration from the back-difference over two ARM sample 
periods, without the need for more elaborate filtering of the rates. 
Figure 4-6 shows the successful isolation of a -0.3 g bias in 
longitudinal accelerometer one, with the simulated misalignment of 
longitudinal accelerometer two 0.02 rad about the aircraft pitch 
axis. The failure is inserted just before the aircraft begins a 2.5 g 
windup turn. The effect of the simulated misalignment and the windup 
turn can be seen as an incr~asing positive TK residual for instrument 
two. Because this residual is significantly smaller than the postu-
lated worst-case error, the MLLR for instrument two remains positive. 
Longitudinal accelerometer one is declared unconditionally failed 129 
samples after failure injection. 
As shown in frame three of Figure 4-6, the postulated worst-case 
error is extremely conservative relative to the observed residual of 
the unfailed instrument, and this conservatism results in a relatively 
long isolation time of nearly 8 seconds. As discussed earlier, the 
fact that the acceleration of the air mass is an unmodeled error 
source in the TK residual equation motivates the inclusion of a 
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wind-shear doublet in the worst-case error term, with the magnitude 
chosen as one of two values based upon the output of a binary turbu-
lence estimator. Significantly faster isolation performance could be 
obtained by lowering the magnitude (perhaps to zero) of the doublet 
used during those times, such as for Figure 4-6, when the turbulence 
estimate is low. 
Figure 4-7 shows the successful isolation of a 0.3 g bias in 
normal accelerometer one during a 3 g turn. As discussed in Section 
3, the TK test for the normal accelerometers is very sensitive to 
errors in the knowledge of the pitch rate. Extensive analysis of 
flight data indicates that pitch rate gyro two has a scale factor of 
approximately 0.9S. The effect of this scale factor error on the es-
timated pitch rate during the windup turn having a pitch rate of 0.09 
rad/s results in the negative ramp for the TK residual for normal 
accelerometer two seen in Figure 4-7. Since the residuals for both 
sensors are identically affected by the pitch rate error, the slope of 
the positive ramp failure signature for normal accelerometer one is 
smaller than it would be in nonrotating flight, accounting for the 
larger number of samples (268) required for isolating the failure. As 
for the longitudinal accelerometers, the isolation time for the normal 
accelerometers could be lowered by decreasing the magnitude of the 
low-turbulence wind-shear doublet used in the worst-case error term. 
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SECTION 5 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Phase I and II flight test programs have demonstrated the 
validity and capability of the ARM concept to achieve fail-operational 
performance with duplex sensors. Of particular importance has been 
the adaptability to unforeseen sensor behavior provided by the worst-
case error terms in the analytic redundancy MLLRs. The ARM algorithm 
design and flight test experience have shown that the identification 
and accommodation of basic, irreducible, low-frequency error sources 
in the analytic redundancy residuals are mandatory for the design of a 
reliable fault isolation system using analytic redundancy. The proper 
interpretation of a low-frequency component in an analytic redundancy 
residual, i.e., sensor failure or error term, has proven a signifi-
cantly more important design issue than the optimality of the decision 
rule that determines wh~ther the component is present. 
An alternate approach to the ARM technique for achieving fail-
operational capability with duplex sensors involves discarding both 
sensors of a particular type when a disparity in their outputs is 
detected, and subsequently using a synthesized value of that variable 
in the control laws. The relationship used to synthesize the missing 
variable would be analogous to the relationships used to generate the 
analytic redundancy residuals in the ARM algorithm. However, it 
should be noted that the ARM approach has two significant advantages 
over this alternative. First, fidelity of the residual relationships 
in the ARM approach is required only over the short time period 
between fault detection and isolation, compared to the remainder of 
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the mission time for the alternate approach. Second, the ARM approach 
incorporates a consistent, self-contained mechanism to accommodate 
errors in the analytic redundancy relationships. Such accommodation 
via the control laws in the alternate approach is much more difficult 
to achieve. 
Reasonability checks, in the form of sensor output self test, 
have proven to be powerful complements to the analytic redundancy 
tests in the ARM technique. This is particularly true for kinematic-
type analytic redundancy tests, some of which require significant 
times to isolate even a hard-failed sensor. The provision for condi-
tional failure declaration has resulted in significant decreases in 
the effective isolation times for BFM-sized failures of the rate 
gyros, lateral accelerometers, and alpha vanes. 
The use of a bias failure hypothesis in the MLLRs does not sig-
nificantly restrict the ability to isolate nonbias failures in duplex 
systems, as i.ndicated by the- roll rate gyro scale-factor isolation 
shown in Figure 4-2. However, it should be noted that if more than 
one simplex sensor is an input to an analytic redundancy residual 
calculation, more elaborate failure mode modeling is required for 
reliable fault isolation. 
Although the ARM software is more extensive than that associated 
with conventional redundancy management algorithms, it is similar in 
complexity to guidance and navigation calculations and posed no un-
usual implementation problems. Furthermore, its modularized structure 
lends itself to distributed computation systems. 
The process of developing the reliable Phase II ARM algorithm 
from the preliminary Phase I version involved either the compensation 
for or accommodation of several error sources in the analytic redun-
dancy relationships. This involved painstaking and tedious ground 
analysis of downlink data recorded during flight testing. Any 
technique requiring a similar level of effort for aircraft-specific 
50 
code initialization or to respond to day-to-day variations in the 
sensors or replacement of faulty units would clearly be impractical 
for fleet-wide application. Therefore, it is recommended that future 
effort be directed toward developing methods whereby FDI algorithms 
utilizing analytic redundancy can be made robust relative to varia-
tions in basic sensor characteristics. The ARM rate gyro bias 
estimators, utilizing rotational kinematics residuals, suggest one 
direction to pursue. Not only do these bias estimates allow certain 
MLLR worst-case error terms to be lowered, but the levels of the 
estimates themselves could be used for fault isolation or trend 
analysis. A recently developed related approach, in which Kalman 
filters are used to estimate the mathematically observable biases and 
scale-factor errors in direct redundant sensors, has given encouraging 
I . . I d' (23) h' 1 h' h' I resu ts ~n s~mu ator stu 1es. W ~ e t 1S approac requ~res rea -
time covariance matrix calculation to achieve optimal estimates, it 
appears to be a promising starting point for the development of 
(possibly suboptimal) estimators of the important sensor biases and 
scale factor errors appearing in analytic redundancy residuals. It 
must be noted, however, that the fact that each sensor error term may 
appear in more than one residual could pose a significant computa-
tional challenge to any sensor calibration error estimation technique. 
Although the integration of the ARM technique into a redundant 
digital flight control system remains an applications problem, the F-8 
DFBW aircraft flight test experience suggests that this is certainly 
within the state-of-the-art. This integrated system could either 
provide fail-operational capability following one more than the 
original design number of identical sensor failures or allow the 
removal of one sensor of each type, representing a significant savings 
in acquisition, spares, and maintenance costs over the life of the 
aircraft. 
Such an integrated system should be capable of monitoring the 
health of any single remaining sensor of a particular type. Although 
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detail design of the required algorithms has not been performed, a 
promising candidate approach exists that is a straightforward adapta-
tion of the ARM algorithm.(24) Basically this approach uses two 
MSPRTs for the single remaining sensor, one postulating a positive 
failure and the other a negative failure. A time interval is chosen, 
significantly shorter than the ETL for the sensor, after which the BFM 
failure signature dominates the noise in the analytic redundancy 
process. If after that interval has passed the LLR portion of the 
MLLR is positive, the MLLR is reset to zero and the process is 
repeated. Otherwise, the MLLR is updated until either: 1) the LLR 
becomes positive, at which time the MLLR is reset to zero, or 2) the 
MLLR crosses the failure threshold and the sensor is identified as 
failed. 
The implementation of such an integrated system on the F-8 DFBW 
aircraft is strongly recommended. Although the flight test program 
reported here, incorporating approximately nine hours of flight time, 
indicated proper functioning of the ARM algorithm, such a test period 
is insufficient to exhaustively exercise a major software package or 
to compile accurate performance statistics such as false alarm and 
missed alarm rates. While an integrated system for the entire set of 
control sensors would be desirable in order to demonstrate the full 
range of benefits and to accumulate the performance characteristics of 
the integrated approach, such a full-scope demonstration is not 
mandatory. In particular, meaningful results could be obtained from 
an integrated system for a subset of the sensors monitored by the ARM 
algorithm, e.g., the attitude and attitude rate sensors. 
Finally, it is well-known that significant savings in the 
replication of sensors measuring components of a vector quantity (such 
as angular velocity or linear acceleration) required to isolate a 
given number of successive sensor failures can be achieved by geomet-
rically skewing the sensors. Thus, instead of the three aligned 
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orthogonal triads of rate gyros and accelerometers employed in the 
baseline F-8 design to isolate a single failed instrument of either 
. ( 1 ) type, skewed arrays of five instruments of each type would suff~ce, 
a savings of eight instruments in all. It is important to note that 
for such a skewed array four instruments remain after the first 
identified failure, allowing only detection of a second failure, and 
that analytic redundancy relationships similar to those in the ARM 
algorithm could be used to isolate the second failure. 
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